HoneyBot: a honeypot for robotic systems by Irvene, Celine







of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science in the
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
December 2017
Copyright © Celine Irvene 2017
HONEYBOT: A HONEYPOT FOR ROBOTIC SYSTEMS
Approved by:
Dr. Beyah, Advisor
School of Electrical and Computer
Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Egerstedt
School of Electrical and Computer
Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Dr. Owen
School of Electrical and Computer
Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Date Approved: December 8, 2017
If you want to go fast, go alone. If you want to go far, go together.
African Proverb
Won’t He do it. Will He won’t.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
All glory be to God. This is for my mother and my father, for my family, my friends, and all
those who supported me. Ya know what . Shout out to those who didn’t support me
too. Still made it!!! Two down, one to go.
v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
Chapter 1: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Primary Contributions and Thesis Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Chapter 2: Background and Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Honeypot Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Cyber-Physical Systems Honeypots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Honeypots and Evasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.4 How the HoneyBot is different . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Chapter 3: Robotics and HoneyBot Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1 Robotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.1.1 Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3.1.2 Actuators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.1.3 Controller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3.2 Honeypot for Robotic Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
vi
3.2.1 Sensor Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
3.3 Proof of Concept HoneyBot Simulator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4 Proof of Concept Sensor Device Modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.4.1 Ultrasonic Sonar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.4.2 Collision Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.4.3 Infrared Distance Sensor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.4.4 Accelerometer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Chapter 4: HoneyBot Experimentation and Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1 Proof of Concept HoneyBot . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4.1.1 HoneyBot Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.1.2 HoneyBot Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2 HoneyBot Experimental Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.1 Proof of Concept HoneyBot Sensor Model Development . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3 Experiment Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.3.1 Research Subject Demographics and Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.3.2 HoneyBot Experiment Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.4 Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.1 HoneyBot Website . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.2 Robotic Platform and Sensors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4.3 Evaluation Caveats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Chapter 5: Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
5.1 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
vii
5.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2.1 Exploring New Robotic Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
5.2.2 Rethinking HoneyBot Remote Access Mechanisms and Evaluation Redesign 39
5.2.3 Optimizing for Speed Over the Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5.2.4 Software Generalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix A: HoneyBot iPhone 5 Compass App Source Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix B: Robot Experiment Instructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.1 Overall Experimental Objective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.2 Experiment Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
B.3 Experiment Steps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
B.4 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Appendix C: Robot Experiment Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Appendix D: Sensor Device Model Creation Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
viii
LIST OF TABLES
2.1 Breakdown of key features for each interaction level honeypot . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4.1 Survey results to questions about robot sensor accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
3.1 GoPiGo2 robot with labeled components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3.2 HoneyBot system architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.3 Screenshots of the HoneyBot simulator (a) HoneyBot Simulator with single robot
inbounds (b) HoneyBot Simulator with single robot out of bounds. True position
shown inbounds. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4 Images of the sensors (a) Ultrasonic sonar (b) Collision sensor (c) Infrared distance
sensor (d) Accelerometer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.6 (a) Plot of the estimated voltage vs measured distance from the experimentally
determined Equation 3.2. (b) Plot of the estimated distance vs equally distributed
voltages from Equation 3.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
4.1 Images of the (a) fully outfitted GoPiGo3 Robot Car (b) GoPiGo3 Circuit Board
(c) and Raspberry Pi 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
4.2 Simplified code snippet from Robot Controller. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
4.3 Images of the HoneyBot sensors (a) Collision sensor (b) iPhone 5 Compass (c)
Ultrasonic sonar (d) Laser Distance sensor (e) and a Temperature sensor. . . . . . . 28
4.4 HoneyMaze with danger signs throughout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4.5 HoneyBot user experiment website. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
4.6 HoneyBot user experiment research participant statistics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
4.7 HoneyBot user experiment research participant locations by US region. . . . . . . 33
4.8 HoneyBot user experiment research participant ethnicity breakdown. . . . . . . . . 33
x
4.9 Survey responses to (a) Question 4 (b) Question 6 (c) and Question 1 from Ap-
pendix C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.10 Top three most navigated routes by participants (a) 56% of subjects took this route
(b) 22% of subjects took this route (c) and 1% of participants took this route. . . . . 35
xi
SUMMARY
Historically, robotics systems have not been built with an emphasis on security. Their main
purpose has been to complete a specific objective, such as to deliver the correct dosage of a drug to
a patient, perform a swarm algorithm, or safely and autonomously drive humans from point A to
point B. As more and more robotic systems become remotely accessible through networks, such as
the Internet, they are more vulnerable to various attackers than ever before. To investigate remote
attacks on networked robotic systems HoneyPhy, a physics-aware honeypot framework, has been
leveraged to create the HoneyBot. The HoneyBot is the first software hybrid interaction honeypot
specifically designed for networked robotic systems. By simulating unsafe actions and physically
performing safe actions on the HoneyBot the intent is to fool attackers into believing their exploits
are successful, while logging all the communication to be used for attribution and threat model
creation.
This thesis presents the HoneyBot and discusses a proof of concept implementation as well as
the HoneyBot simulator. The HoneyBot prototype swaps between physical actuation and using




A robot is a device or mechanism guided by automated controls that can do the work of a person
or perform complicated repetitive tasks [1]. Robots are used for a variety of different reasons, the
most prominent of them being the elimination of the use of human operators. There are three main
reasons for this; the first is to save on labor, which ultimately reduces costs. For instance, in the
car manufacturing industry robots on the plant floor cost about $5.67 an hour over the course of
their lifetime (including maintenance and energy costs), while the comparable human labor costs
over $40 an hour (including wages, pension, and health care) [2]. The second reason to eliminate
human operators is because human interaction might be bad for the product. This is seen in the
semiconductor manufacturing process, which consists of hundreds of steps. If at any point there is
contamination (usually due to human error), the whole wafer could be ruined and the process must
be restarted with a new one. The final, and arguably, most important reason for using robots is that
the product or job may be too dangerous for humans. Imagine an encampment near a war zone,
hours after a covert enemy attack has wiped out a squadron. The grounds are littered with corpses
and debris and immediately after the assault not much can be done to rectify the situation. Rather
than sending more troops to risk their lives, military robots can be sent to identify and collect the
remains. Now imagine that same encampment if military robots had been used for battle instead
of soldiers, the loss of life would have been minimized and even though there would have been
equipment loss, the underlying intellectual property would still be available and the machinery
rebuilt.
The current measures available for avoiding scenarios like those previously mentioned, though
limited, are growing and being deployed each day. These measures include technologies such
as drones and unmanned ground vehicles. To reap the benefits of these robots they must be
autonomous, remotely controlled, or a combination of the two. Given the variability of most
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missions, it is usually more desirable to have remote access through a network. While remotely
accessible robots allow for more convenience and easier operational use, it opens them up to sim-
ilar vulnerabilities as the ones faced in traditional computer networks. A classic example of this
is Stuxnet, commonly known as the world’s first digital weapon. Stuxnet was a 500KB com-
puter worm that infected the software of at least 14 industrial sites in Iran, including a uranium-
enrichment plant [3]. It worked by compromising the Siemens Step7 software used to program
the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) driving the Iranian centrifuges. Once Stuxnet had ac-
cess to the PLCs, the worm’s creators were then able to take control of the industrial systems and
caused the fast-spinning centrifuges to tear themselves apart, unbeknownst to the plant operators.
The Stuxnet attacks were speculated to have been done over the course of several months by ma-
nipulating process pressure and centrifuge rotor speeds in an attempt to damage them and delay
the Iranian nuclear program [4]. Stuxnet, if nothing else, has demonstrated that injecting malicious
code on cyber physical systems (CPSs), often embedded and real-time, is possible and that every
networked or remotely accessible system is at risk.
A CPS attack that occurred more recently than Stuxnet took place at the University of Wash-
ington where security researchers were able to hack a teleoperated surgical robot [5]. The lack of
trained surgeons has been a major obstacle preventing life-saving surgeries from being performed
in many parts of the world, and one solution to this involves leveraging the Internet and robotics.
Teleoperated surgical robots enable expert surgeons to be in one country or region controlling a
robot that physically performs a surgery in another country or region. The sale of these types of
medical robots and others has been increasing at a rate of 20 percent per year and is expected to
keep growing [6]. The rapid rise in popularity of teleoperated surgical robots has drawn the at-
tention of several security experts at the University of Washington, leading them to discover that
malicious attackers can disrupt the behavior of telerobots during surgery or take them over com-
pletely. The attack was performed on Raven II, a robot designed to reduce the size of medical
robots and to improve their durability for use in extreme environments. The robot is built on a
Linux based computer running the Robot Operating System [7] and communicates via the Inter-
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operable Telesurgery Protocol [8] over a public network with support for wireless and low link
quality connections. This connectivity which is so helpful for saving lives is also what makes it
vulnerable. ”Due to the open and uncontrollable nature of communication networks, it becomes
easy for malicious entities to jam, disrupt, or take over the communication between a robot and a
surgeon,” according to the researchers [6]. The attack’s only requirement was that the malicious
user be connected to the same network as the control console of the telerobot. The researchers per-
formed three kinds of attacks on an experimental operation where the operator must move blocks
from one peg board to another. They then measured the rate of task completion and the operator
reported difficulty while under attack. Of the three types of attacks performed, the most appalling
was how they were able to hijack a connection over the Interoperable Telesurgery Protocol due
to insecure sequence number processing. This allowed them to take control of the teleoperated
procedure and inject packets that triggered the built-in automatic stop mechanism, resulting in a
denial of service (DOS) attack on the robot [5].
The prevalence of robotics is growing in all facets of everyday life and robots are becoming a
crucial part of the ecosystem. They are relied upon for military purposes on the war front, they are
relied upon for assisting doctors in the healthcare industry, and even first responders and the police
use them. If steps aren’t taken to secure robotic devices they will become serious safety threats.
In computer security, the first step to securing a resource is traditionally the development of a
threat model. A threat model can help assess the probability and the potential harm, which can be
useful in minimizing or eradicating the threat. Historically, security in robotics has not been an
eminent concern, so to determine a valid threat model these systems must be studied and monitored
to learn the scope of attacks they could face. This thesis asserts that this can be accomplished with
a honeypot specially designed for robotic systems, called the HoneyBot. The HoneyBot is the
first software hybrid interaction honeypot specifically designed for networked robotic systems. By
simulating unsafe actions and physically performing safe actions on the HoneyBot the goal is to
fool attackers into believing their exploits are successful, while logging all the communication to
be used for attribution and threat model creation.
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1.1 Primary Contributions and Thesis Organization
The primary contributions of this thesis are the following:
• An initial version of the HoneyBot is proposed, which leverages HoneyPhy, a physics-aware
honeypot framework
• A software proof of concept HoneyBot simulator is presented in Python
• A hardware proof of concept is implemented for the HoneyBot using the GoPiGo 3 robotics
platform
• Five device models are created for the sensors of the HoneyBot
• Results from a user experiment where participants control the HoneyBot are presented
The remainder of this thesis is presented as follows: Chapter 2 describes related honeypot
works and CPS specific honeypots. It also details honeypot evasion techniques, alluding to how the
HoneyBot avoids these techniques. Chapter 3 provides background information on robotic systems
and describes the architecture of the HoneyBot. Chapter 4 describes experiments performed to
prove feasibility and build the required sensor Device Models. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the
conclusion and potential avenues for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
2.1 Honeypot Classification
Since their inception, honeypots have primarily focused on the traditional IT computing domain,
seeking to monitor attackers that aim to compromise company and government workstations/servers.
Several different classes of honeypots were created. Honeypots were classified based on their lev-
els of interaction and simulation. In addition to these previously defined classes, previous work in
the Communications Assurance and Performance (CAP) Group[9], defines a ”hybrid” interaction
honeypot. This is a honeypot that dynamically swaps between being low-interaction and high-
interaction given certain triggering conditions. Table 2.1 breaks down the differences between
these classes of honeypots.



































2.2 Cyber-Physical Systems Honeypots
The first honeynet (a network of honeypots) for CPSs/SCADA (supervisory control and data acqui-
sition) was created by Pothamsetty and Franz of the Cisco Infrastructure Assurance Group (CIAG)
in 2004 [10]. The goal was to simulate a few popular PLC services to help researchers better un-
derstand the risks of exposed control system devices. This work has laid the foundation for many
other CPS honeypots [9] [11] [12], none of which, though, are directly applicable to the robotics
domain. With the prevalence of robotic systems on the rise, it is critical that advanced monitoring
techniques, such as honeypots, be extended to defend them. Though the inspiration for this work
comes from [9], and leverages the concept of hybrid interaction honeypot, the HoneyBot deviates
in its robotic system specialization.
2.3 Honeypots and Evasion
Honeypot evasion is, as with most security problems, a cat and mouse game. There almost always
exist configuration fingerprints for any honeypot, and they are corrected as attackers discover them
and defenders must devise appropriate improvements. An early example is the high-interaction
honeynet, Sebek [13], which was discovered and trivialized (exposed as a honeynet) by techniques
described in [14]. The techniques revealed how to detect, circumvent, and blind Sebek. Con-
sequently, the fingerprints Sebek exposed were remedied by leveraging a similar system called
Qebek that utilized virtualized high-interaction systems [15]. For many non-high-interaction hon-
eypots, evasion boils down to finding the edges of emulation for the presented services, but timing
approaches have also been used [16]. For example, Kippo is a popular medium-interaction hon-
eypot for the SSH (Secure Shell) service [17]. Kippo is easily detected by sending a number of
carriage returns, and noting the output difference from production SSH servers [18]. While high-
interaction honeypots are harder to detect, many rely on virtualization. Virtualization technologies
usually leave their own fingerprints, such as device names, device driver names, file-system hall-
marks, and loaded kernel modules [19]. Even though these fingerprints can be altered, there exists
6
a rich set of techniques for detecting virtualization (and defeating detection attempts) from the
malware-analysis field [20].
Other, more honeypot-technology agnostic, detection techniques have been proposed. Some of
these techniques rely on the liability issues inherent in hosting deliberately compromised machines.
A botnet architecture proposed in [21] leverages the honeypot owner’s desire to restrict outgoing
malicious traffic to authenticate new hosts before integrating them into the botnet. Specifically, the
new host is directed to send apparently malicious traffic to an already compromised ”sensor”. Most
honeypot systems will attempt to identify and block or modify this malicious traffic, so whether
or not the sensor receives the traffic unaltered can be used to determine if the new host is genuine.
This work was built upon [22], where multiple pieces of evidence can be formally combined to
derive a metric of likelihood that a host is a honeypot. This evidence could be the virtualization
status of the host, the diversity of software on the host, the level of activity of the host, or the
difficulty in compromising the host. This newer technique is presented in the context of a botnet,
but the generalized belief metric is equally applicable to any honeypot technology, depending on
the evidence used. There are also techniques described in two more recent surveys [23] [24],
which elaborate on the themes mentioned above. Themes such as finding edges of emulation,
finding subtle discrepancies that indicate virtualization, or analyzing the results of communication
with an already compromised sensor.
2.4 How the HoneyBot is different
The HoneyBot attempts to address the honeypot shortcomings stated in Section 2.3, specifically
for robotic systems. Firstly, the robotic system exists and is in use, which remedies the traditional
lack of context and provides convincing evidence correlated with a real system. The HoneyBot
is not virtualized, but implemented on actual hardware. The robotic system fully implements the
presented services, so all system responses are in line with the HoneyBot devices. The HoneyBot is
the first software hybrid interaction honeypot specifically designed for networked robotic systems.
By simulating unsafe actions and physically performing safe actions on the HoneyBot the goal is
7
to fool attackers into believing their exploits are successful, while logging all the communication
to be used for attribution and threat model creation.
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CHAPTER 3
ROBOTICS AND HONEYBOT ARCHITECTURE
3.1 Robotics
The field of robotics is constantly changing, but the components that unite almost every class of
robots are sensors, actuators, and controllers. Figure 3.1 shows a labeled diagram of the GoPiGo2
robot [25] denoting these components. Some background information on the basic building blocks
of robotics is, required to describe how the HoneyBot presents a honeypot for a full robotic system
and is presented in the next three subsections.
Figure 3.1: GoPiGo2 robot with labeled components
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3.1.1 Sensors
Sensors are the robot’s eyes and ears; they enable the robot to understand the world around it
and judge several features of the environment. Some examples of common sensors on a robot
include: cameras, thermometers, IR (infrared) and sonar, accelerometers, and magnetometers. The
HoneyBot must be able to ”spoof”, through simulation, all sensor values outputted by the robot
such that the attackers are incognizant of the change. To do this device models were developed
that provide realistic system responses given an ”unsafe/indeterminate” input from an attacker.
One such model that was developed is for the Grove SEN10737P Ultrasonic Sonar. This device
model was crafted through lab experimentation and empirical observation; such that for a given
speed and distance the model mimics the true response time of an ultrasonic pulse, and ”spoofs”
the distance measured. This data is used to provide a reasonably timed response to the user such
that there is no distinguishable difference when comparing the time taken for a simulated response
versus an actual response. More details about experimentation and device modeling can be found
in Sections 3.4.1 through 3.4.4.
In addition to spoofing individual sensor values, the HoneyBot must also spoof the correlation
between sensors values. For instance, if the purpose of a certain robot is to navigate efficiently
through an indoor-outdoor obstacle course, an attacker who sends commands to continually ram
the robot into a wall in the outdoor portion of the course would not only expect to see the distance
sensors reflecting these actions, but also the temperature sensor should reflect the outdoor tem-
perature during a hot summer day. In this scenario, the HoneyBot would be triggered to perform
simulations once the bad commands are received and would not actually allow the robot to crash
into the wall, but instead output alternating distance sensor readings reflecting wall proximity and
sensible temperature readings based on the known context of the robot’s state. Given the sporadic
nature of electronic components when subjected to conditions they are not built to support, one
response (when destructive/unsafe commands aimed at destroying the robot are received) of the
HoneyBot will be to disallow the occurrence of the actions and take down the connection to the
attacker in a manner that suggests the robot has failed/died and was abruptly taken offline.
10
3.1.2 Actuators
The next component common to every class of robots is the actuators. Actuators enable the robot
to modify the environment and move (or actuate). Some examples of these components include
motors, speakers, and tools that go on the end of robotic arms, known as manipulators, like ham-
mers, shovels, or even scalpels in the case of surgical robots. Since the proof of concept HoneyBot
implementation lives in a robot that operates in networked environments and users/attackers have
no physical or visual access to it, this work does not focus on modeling the underlying control
system of the actuators. Instead, the emphasize is on accurately simulating the timing of system
responses and how user commands will change the state of the overarching system. In addition to
this, realistic device fingerprints and responses are generated and sent back to remote users over the
network. To do this, the HoneyBot must know what commands are safe and can be performed, and
what commands are unsafe and must be simulated. Determining the ”safety” of user commands is
a hard problem to solve, and many researchers have worked on formal methods for verifying the
safe navigation of ground robots [26] [27] [28] [29]. Though it is not the focus of this work, these
works could be leveraged and incorporated into the HoneyBot as the Input Verification module is
built for plug and play. As shown in Figure 3.2 all the commands received by the robotic system
are passed through the Input Verification module to determine their fitness to be performed. Given
the command and the current system state, the module must output whether the action is safe or
unsafe. If deemed safe, the HoneyBot will allow the command to be performed. Otherwise, the
command is not sent to the actuators but instead is simulated.
3.1.3 Controller
The third, and arguably most important, component of a robot is the control system or controller.
The controller, also known as the brain of the robot, enables the robot to parse commands, send
signals to different devices, and communicate with other robots as well as with the user. The
HoneyBot is software that will live in the robot’s controller so that it can easily access all data
commands and signals to and from the robot’s brain allowing it to make the necessary decisions.
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Figure 3.2 shows the flow of the HoneyBot system architecture, a user/attacker remotely con-
nects to the networked robotic system through the Internet and can send commands. All the com-
mands received by the robot will be logged and passed to the Input Verification module, which as
stated earlier is flexible in structure and can be very comprehensive in the evaluation of commands
or relaxed depending on application needs. If the Input Verification module deems a command
safe, the action will be performed as usual and the system response will be returned to the user/at-
tacker. If, on the other hand, the Input Verification module deems a command unsafe the command
will be simulated in real time and the ”spoofed” system response will be generated and returned.
Figure 3.2: HoneyBot system architecture
3.2 Honeypot for Robotic Systems
Most existing CPS honeypots neglect certain aspects of these systems that can alert an attacker
to the nature of the honeypot, namely the physics of the devices that interact with the process
[9]. That is why the HoneyBot is based on HoneyPhy. HoneyPhy is a generic physics-aware
honeypot framework that accurately models software and protocol fingerprints which are then
used to simulate the CPS and fool attackers who access the honeypot [9]. The HoneyBot then
applies this generic framework, and tailors it to the specifics of a robotics system. The HoneyPhy
framework is composed of three main modules: the Internet Interface, the Process Model, and the
Device Model modules. As applied to the HoneyBot, the Internet Interface Module is used for
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opening ports or interfaces on the robotic system so that it can connect to a network. It can also
be used to support multiple connections to other networked robots and verify that state ensuring
commands are always received by the correct robot at the correct port/address. In other words, the
Internet Interface is the user facing interface, the front end that the attacker can see. The Process
Model is triggered by an ”unsafe” or ”indeterminate” command, and the action will be simulated
in real time by querying the appropriate device model rather than sent to be deterministically
performed on the robot. The Device Model is different from the other modules in that it contains
a model representative of each device found within a robot. These models are built using real data
gathered from a given device. Several proof of concept device models were built, details of which
can be found in Section 3.4.
Device models are used for ”spoofing” response times and data from sensors when the Hon-
eyBot receives malicious commands. The details of the experimental set up and infrared distance
sensor model building can be found in Section 3.4.3. One example of a possible model to include
amongst the models in a robotic systems’ Device Model could be of the robot’s motor. When the
HoneyBot is sent a command to normally power the motor or any otherwise safe/benign com-
mand, the HoneyBot will allow the action to be performed. However, when the HoneyBot is sent a
command to overpower the robot’s motor, the Process Model will query the motor’s Device Model
and simulate the overpowering of the motor. The HoneyBot then changes the system state and
responds to the attacker with data reflecting the sudden change in power to the motors. In general,
the procedure for calling the Process Model will entail simulating an incoming malicious com-
mand and responding with the data obtained through simulation. Due to the seamless switches
between allowing the robot to physically perform ”safe” commands and simulating ”unsafe” or
”indeterminate” commands, the HoneyBot is classified as a hybrid interaction honeypot.
3.2.1 Sensor Correlation
Sensor correlation is the data consistency across a robotic system that keeps attackers’ believing
they are interacting and controlling a real system. For any machine that performs tasks and re-
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ports back to users, sensors (in addition to supplying critical information for understanding an
environment) provide vital insight to the equipment’s operational status. Moreover, they can re-
lay information about the task as well, like whether it was performed to completion or not. For
instance, with the HoneyBot the battery is a tell-tale sign of how much work the robot has done
as well as how much more work it can do on that charge. Sensors can also conflict with each
other. Consider an IR proximity sensor; it is a very effective means of measuring distance, but it
is often susceptible to interference from outside light sources and changes in material reflectivity.
Now consider ultrasonic sonar; it is also efficient at range detection (and for longer distances), but
can be fooled by textures and echoes. Individually, if faced with either of their weaknesses these
sensors will fail to perform accurately, but when used in conjunction they prove almost infallible.
Formally, let S represent the set of all n sensors on a specific robot, with some sensors be-
ing correlated and others completely independent. An intelligent attacker wishing to determine
whether his malicious commands are being sent to a honeypot or to a real system can first build a
ground truth of the sensor correlation behavior by collecting data during ”normal” operation and




an n x n correlation matrix, Rtrue. Now, as he begins to send malicious commands to the robot,
he can continually monitor the sensor data streams, calculating new correlation matrices Rtest, and
monitoring for changes in the correlation behavior. Mathematically, to make a decision Di de-
ciding if sensor Si is real or simulated, the attacker first chooses some distance metric d, such as
the L2 norm, and some threshold ε. The attacker then determines the L2 norm of the difference
between row i of Rtest with row i of Rtrue. If the result is greater than the threshold, this tells the




real d(Rtrue[i], Rtest[i]) ≤ ε
simulated else
(3.1)
This is why sensor correlation within the HoneyBot is so important. Under normal operation
14
many sensors in a system will be related and, thus, under simulation these relationships must still
hold and the sensor values must dynamically update with each user command. In order to accom-
plish this, each device model for the HoneyBot sensors was built using physical device properties
and real device data. Device modeling causes simulated responses to mirror true operation in an
effort to avert attacker detection for as long as possible.
3.3 Proof of Concept HoneyBot Simulator
As a proof of concept model for the HoneyBot, a simulator was developed. The HoneyBot sim-
ulator is a GUI (graphical user interface) tool that provides a graphical and interactive resource
for users to envision an attacker scenario in a networked robotic system (where the HoneyBot has
been implemented). Screenshots of the simulator can be seen in Figure 3.3.
(a) (b)
Figure 3.3: Screenshots of the HoneyBot simulator (a) HoneyBot Simulator with single robot
inbounds (b) HoneyBot Simulator with single robot out of bounds. True position shown inbounds.
The simulator displays a control panel to the left of a 16 x 16 bounded area, where the center 10
x 10 grid is the legal boundary for the robots to roam and perform tasks. Normal and benign activity
can be performed within the 10 x 10 grid; this is representative of the traditional user privilege
zone. Outside of the legal boundary is the ”honey”, an extra boundary which is representative of
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resources that are attractive to an attacker, like open ports or unpatched software in a traditional
computer network. In the simulator, a robot is represented by a GoPiGo2 image and has the
following attributes: unique ID, velocity, position, box number, IR sensor values, legal moves, a
value corresponding to whether the robot is within the legal bounds or not, and a value denoting if
it is currently selected. Position is the robot’s location in coordinate form and box number is the
location in terms of the number of boxes from the first legal box (each of these location indicators
can be derived from each other). The velocity is the number of boxes a robot can move at a time
and the default value is 1. The IR sensor readings indicate how far in boxes the robot is from
the legal boundary to the north, south, east, and west at any given moment. Given its velocity, a
robot will have n number of possible next boxes that it can move to and this knowledge is always
maintained by the bot. Two Boolean values tell the robot whether it is within the legal boundaries
of the grid and if it is currently selected. Only one robot on the grid can move at a time and that
robot must be ”selected”. This is indicated in the GUI by highlighting that robot. There is one
attribute of the robot that is not exposed to the user, and this is the robot’s true position. The true
position is the system administrators’ way of keeping tabs on the actual location of the robot. True
position is the only sensor that will not ”lie”. In the simulator, when a robot is out of bounds all the
information sent back to the user reflects this, from the IR sensor readings to the position updates,
and even to the next moves it can make. This falsified information, shown in the Control Panel,
is what the user has access to, while the true position, as represented in Figure 3.3b where the
robot is still inbounds, is only known to the system administrator. In this way, the attacker will
be unaware he/she is being monitored and will continue performing the malicious actions. The
malicious actions, in the case of a ground robot, could include the running of the robot into the
edge of the true boundary to cause physical damage or robot-robot collisions.
3.4 Proof of Concept Sensor Device Modeling
For sensor model development used to simulate the sensor behavior, a combination of techniques
were employed, including experimentation and physical process modeling. The idea is that the
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models built would be queried at runtime to generate ”spoofed” responses which get sent back to
attackers when they perform malicious or otherwise unsafe actions. Suppose that the HoneyBot
was implemented in a military drone used for finding Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and
that it received a command directing it to go through a no-fly zone. Clearly, there is something
suspicious so the Input Verification module will flag the action as unsafe. Then, the drone queries
its GPS device model and sends back false coordinates, while maintaining its position in an unre-
stricted area, but leading the user to believe it is elsewhere. Device models must not only provide
realistic state-aware data, but they must also reflect the correlation between sensors. For example,
the distance sensors must corroborate the reported velocity data, and the velocity data must be in
line with the encoder readings.
To create the most convincing HoneyBot possible, the sensor device models were built to
closely mirror reality. To do this this a GrovePi (a circuit board for connecting various sensors
to the GoPiGo2 robot) [30] was purchased as well as several Grove sensors from Seeed Studio.
The GrovePi costs about $40 and the Grove sensors typically cost no more than $20 each. Device
models were built for for the GrovePi SEN10737P Ultrasonic Sonar, the Sharp GP2Y0A21YK
IR proximity sensor, STMicroelectronics LSM303D 6-Axis Accelerometer & Compass, and the
Sensolute MVS0608.02 Collision sensor. Each of these sensors can be seen in Figure 3.4 and the
rest of this chapter discusses them in detail.
(a) (b) (c) (d)




Figure 3.5: Zoomed in distance vs time for all 7 speeds on one plot.
The GrovePi SEN10737P Ultrasonic Sonar (shown in Figure 3.4a) is a non-contact medium range
distance measurement module which works at 42KHz. This sonar is rated for measuring objects
between 3cm and 400cm, but we found that it was only accurate up to approximately 200cm. This
lack of reliability is likely due to its inexpensive manufacturing, as it was not built for high fidelity
sensing. An experimental test environment was set up in a laboratory to measure the time taken for
the ultrasonic sensor attached to the HoneyBot driving at different speeds towards a static target.
The lab set up consisted of placing the robot 183cm away from a target and then driving it towards
the target while taking distance and ultrasonic pulse time measurements. Ten trials per each of the
seven chosen speeds (50 to 200 by increments of 25) of the robot were performed, 70 measurements
in total. The speed on the GoPiGo2 robotic platform is unit-less and represents a percentage of the
full power the motors can get. For example, 0 is for no movement at all (the motors are stopped)
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and 255 is for setting the duty cycle at 100%. The objective was to succinctly determine the time
taken to perform an ultrasonic pulse for a specific speed and distance from a target. The times
were all recorded in a dataframe along with the corresponding distance and speed and are queried
at runtime when a malicious command is given and the HoneyBot must simulate a sonar reading.
We created plots from seven lab experiments (where the ten trials have been averaged) that were
run in order to map ultrasonic sensor obtained distances to the time taken for the ultrasonic pulse to
be received as the HoneyBot approached a target at various speeds. Figure 3.5 shows the results of
each speed plotted together. From Figure 3.5 (and underlying the sonar theory) we determined that
at these low speeds and short distances the robot speed does not influence the time for an ultrasonic
pulse to occur.
3.4.2 Collision Sensor
The Sensolute MVS0608.02 Collision sensor (shown in Figure 3.4b) is a micro vibration sensor
that records motion and vibrations through a gold-plated moving micro-ball. Due to its small size,
it is perfect for mounting on the HoneyBot and detecting obstacle collisions. The digital sensor
outputs a high signal when a collision is detected and a low signal if no collision is detected. To
develop the device model for simulating the collision sensor, the sensors sensitivity to collisions
had to first be tuned to ignore the rumblings of the robotic wheels and to only identify major
crashes as triggers. The sensitivity was tuned by introducing delay to the querying process and
by verifying the collision status after the delay. For instance, instead of querying the device every
quarter of a second we might query every half second. If the sensor reads high (implying there
was a collision) then a delay of approximately 50ms was taken and the sensor queried again. If
the sensor still read high, then it was concluded that a collision occurred. Due to the binary nature
of the device, spoofing the output was as simple as returning a trigger event to the user when a
simulated crash occurred.
The collision sensor device model was built and tested through a series of trials where the
HoneyBot was placed on the ground varying distances from an obstacle and driven towards it. Each
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time a false positive trigger event occurred the delay was modified. It was eventually empirically
determined that a delay of 50ms produced the most accurate results on the ground surface. The
Sensolute MVS0608.02 Collision sensor costs about $10 and at this price point reliability tends to
be inconsistent. It was found that the delay factor had to be tuned for different ground surfaces,
but once properly calibrated has 90% accuracy.
The key to simulating a collision is in the corroboration of sensors. The collision sensor device
can easily be made to trigger a collision event, but it must first read from the distance sensors that
it has closed in on an obstacle/barrier and they must reflect this by outputting a ”spoofed” position.
3.4.3 Infrared Distance Sensor
The Sharp GP2Y0A21YK IR proximity sensor (shown in Figure 3.4c) is a general-purpose short
range distance measuring sensor. This sensor is rated for measuring distances between 10cm and
80cm. It works by using triangulation and a small linear CCD (charge-coupled device) array to
output an analog voltage, which can be used to compute the distance of objects in its field of
view. The measuring process starts with a pulse of IR light being emitted from the emitter, which
travels out and either hits an object or does not. If there is no object, the light is never reflected
and the voltage reading is low. If the light reflects off an object, it returns to the detector and
creates a triangle between the point of reflection, the emitter, and the detector. Because of this
triangulation the outputted analog values do not have a linear relationship to the distance from the
object. Given this, a common method of determining distance is to build a plot of voltage outputted
from the sensor versus distance (measured manually) and derive a function from the fit of the line.
Equation 3.2 was derived from data collected by a user who performed the experiment described
above, plotted, and fit a line [31]. This user’s data is verified by the Sharp datasheet [32] and thus
Equation 3.2 is accepted as valid. In Figure 3.6a, we can see a plot created from Equation 3.2.
Equation 3.3 was computed by simply solving Equation 3.2 for distance. A plot of Equation 3.3,
where a vector of voltages equally distributed from 80 to 600 by steps of 5, can be seen in Figure
3.6b. Given these two equations and an understanding that the voltage increases as objects become
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closer, ”spoofing” the IR distance sensor was fairly straightforward. When a malicious navigation
command is received by the HoneyBot, both the IR and the ultrasonic sonar device models will be
queried and provided with a precalculated distance. The IR device model will use the precalculated
distance in Equation 3.2 and return the voltage in the system response. The precalculated distance
is determined by the HoneyBot through position estimation based on the malicious command given
by the user and knowledge of the true and ”spoofed” state of the robot.
(a)
(b)
Figure 3.6: (a) Plot of the estimated voltage vs measured distance from the experimentally de-
termined Equation 3.2. (b) Plot of the estimated distance vs equally distributed voltages from
Equation 3.3.
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observedV oltage = 1893.9 ∗ distance−0.92 (3.2)
distance = 3650.4/observedV oltage1.087 (3.3)
3.4.4 Accelerometer
The STMicroelectronics LSM303D 6-Axis Accelerometer & Compass (shown in Figure 3.4d) is a
3-axis accelerometer combined with a 3-axis magnetometer (or compass). An accelerometer mea-
sures the acceleration of an object relative to inertia or free-fall, not an increase in speed like some
might assume. This means the accelerometer will provide readings even when an object is static
due to the gravitational pull of the Earth. One useful application of this is that in free fall the sensor
will measure 0, highly sensitive accelerometers are used in the automotive industry for instanta-
neous airbag deployment in the event of an accident [33]. Since the proof of concept HoneyBot
is a ground robot (moving in the X-Y plane) and the 3-axis accelerometer is not highly sensitive
it does not provide much interesting data so no model was developed for it. For other types of
robots, such as quadcopters, that have the ability to rotate on different axes and change orienta-
tion it may prove more useful. The compass, on the other hand, is much more useful for ground
navigation as the heading (route course) informs the operator of the direction of travel. For the
proof of concept operation of the HoneyBot there are four user accessible navigation commands;
forward, backward, left, and right. As long as it is powered on, the HoneyBot will have a heading
and to convince users of normal operation when commands are actually simulated, this heading
must always correspond with other sensors and reflect updates in user commands. When building
this model the two most important things were:
• Preserving the true heading of the HoneyBot, which is the real heading provided by the
compass
• Maintaining the spoofed heading by referencing the true heading the first time a navigation
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command is simulated and updating accordingly and from then on referencing the spoofed
heading and updating it
To accurately determine the spoofed heading after the initial deviation from the true heading 20
trials of a lab experiment were run. For the experimental setup the HoneyBot was placed on the
ground at a denoted marker. A hardware compass was then used to measure the heading of the
robot’s direction. Then a Python script was executed which made the robot drive forward for 5
seconds, make a turn (left or right), and then continue driving in that direction for 5 more seconds
before coming to a stop. Once the maneuvering finished the program measured the robot’s new
heading. The heading data from each of the trials was compiled into a CSV and used to determined
the average degree of rotation for performing left and right turns. When queried for the spoofed
heading, given the knowledge of the direction of turn, the compass Device Model will use the
average degree of rotation plus some random noise to simulate the new HoneyBot heading.
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CHAPTER 4
HONEYBOT EXPERIMENTATION AND EVALUATION
In order to prove the feasibility of the HoneyBot framework and architecture as it applies to real
robotic systems, a proof of concept was constructed and evaluated through user experimentation.
The design details of this proof of concept HoneyBot and experimentation are described in this
chapter.
4.1 Proof of Concept HoneyBot
The GoPiGo 3 [25], shown in Figure 4.1a, was the chosen robotic system for the proof of concept
HoneyBot. This platform was selected because of the ease of programming, through its support
of the Python programming language, and the many I/O interfaces for attaching various robotic
sensors. In addition to this the GoPiGo 3 was selected over the GoPiGo 2, used for initial model
development, because of its magnetic encoders which ensure accurate robot control and its re-
designed power management system which gives it longer battery life. These upgrades were cru-
cial to performing the evaluation described in Section 4.2. The GoPiGo 3 Robot Car is a ground
robot that consists of six major components: a GoPiGo 3 circuit board, a Raspberry Pi 3 [34], two
motors, two wheels, various sensors, and a battery pack. The GoPiGo 3 circuit board, shown in
Figure 4.1b, can be considered the secondary controller of the GoPiGo 3 Robot Car. It connects to
the header pins of the Raspberry Pi 3, shown in Figure 4.1c, and receives motor control commands
as well as provides status updates about the various connected sensors. The Raspberry Pi 3 is the
main controller of the robot and can be accessed via direct connection (through its HDMI port),





Figure 4.1: Images of the (a) fully outfitted GoPiGo3 Robot Car (b) GoPiGo3 Circuit Board (c)
and Raspberry Pi 3.
4.1.1 HoneyBot Software
The HoneyBot software was written in Python 2.7 and is made up of three main modules:
• Robot Web Server: The robot web server is essentially the Internet Interface Module from
the HoneyPhy framework and serves to communicate and transport commands from the front
end (webpage) to the robot’s actual hardware. The server was written using the Tornado
web framework [35]. The web server is the process that is called to spin up every other
module. When executed the web server instantiates a robot object (the robot controller), a
HoneyBot object (the honeybot module), serves up the HoneyBot login page, and facilitates
all web requests from clients through web sockets. The HoneyBot login page was used to
safeguard the robot experimentation and evaluation process by defending access to the robots
hardware with a rotating pairs of usernames and passwords. Before anyone could access the
robot experiment website they had to enter a correct username/password pair and each set of
credentials could only be used once before being invalidated, like a nonce.
• Robot Controller: The robot controller can be considered the Process Model from the Hon-
eyPhy framework as it receives commands from the robot web server and translates them to
navigational commands for the robot to perform or simulate. For instance, if the user clicks
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the right arrow key this is transported over a web socket from the client web page to the
Tornado web server backend. The backend makes a call to the robot controller object which
converts it to a navigation command and passes that to the Input Verification Module along
with the robots’ current status. The Input Verification Module then determines whether or
not the command is safe to perform and if it is it gets sent to the robot’s motors. If unsafe
the honeybot module queries the sensor Device Models and spoofed data is returned. A code
snippet defining this process is shown in Figure 4.2.
1 def actuateRobot( self, direction, xLoc, yLoc):
2 # Input verification stage




6 # Action is safe - actuate
7 gopigo.move()
8
9 # Update status variables for GUI with real data
10 sysStatus = honeybot.trueStatusUpdate()
11 else:
12 # Action is unsafe - simulate
13 gopigo.stop()
14
15 logger.info("HoneyBot in danger zone")
16
17 # Update status variables for GUI with spoofed data
18 sysStatus = honeybot.simulateStatusUpdate(direction, xLoc,
yLoc)
Figure 4.2: Simplified code snippet from Robot Controller.
• HoneyBot Module: The honeybot module is responsible for running a background process
that constantly queries the robot for true sensor data. If the Input Verification Module detects
an unsafe command the robot controller will call the honeybot modules’ simulateStatusUp-
date method and each of the robot’s sensor Device Models will be queried for simulated data.




The proof of concept HoneyBot had five sensors, shown in Figure 4.3: a Sensolute MVS0608.02
Collision Sensor, an iPhone 5 Compass, a GrovePi SEN10737P Ultrasonic Sonar, a Dexter In-
dustries Laser Distance Sensor, and an Aosong DHT11 Temperature Sensor. These sensors were
chosen because of their significance to real-world ground robot applications. A collision sensor
can be crucial to the well being of navigational robots, that are autonomous or remotely controlled,
as they are the first line of defense for detecting and preventing costly damage to robotic end-
effectors due to robot crashes [36]. A collision sensor on a deployed autonomous robotic system
can be used to report damage to relevant parties who may be physically distant. In order to know
where to dispatch rescue teams, monitoring parties need to know the robots’ location. This is
where the compass, laser distance, and ultrasonic sonar sensors come in to play. While they don’t
provide absolute location, like a GPS would, in many indoor or well-defined environments they
are equally useful.
An iPhone 5 was used as the compass for the proof of concept HoneyBot because it provided
more accurate headings than the STMicroelectronics LSM303D 6-Axis Accelerometer & Com-
pass. The small magnetometer in the accelerometer could not overcome the interference from the
many electrical components on the GoPiGo 3 and produced inaccurate data. The iPhone 5 has
much better internal component shielding and did not suffer from interference when placed near
the robot. An iOS mobile application, called RoboCompass, was written in the Swift program-
ming language and downloaded to the phone. The RoboCompass App, source code can be found
in Appendix A, sends compass readings in IP dataframes to the HoneyBot web server every time







Figure 4.3: Images of the HoneyBot sensors (a) Collision sensor (b) iPhone 5 Compass (c) Ultra-
sonic sonar (d) Laser Distance sensor (e) and a Temperature sensor.
4.2 HoneyBot Experimental Design
Since the HoneyBot proof of concept was built on a ground robot, the best form of evaluation
was determined to be a navigational task. To support this, an evaluation arena was built in the
form of a 10 x 12 foot maze (shown in Figure 4.4) and participants (with no prior knowledge of the
research) were recruited over the course of one week to remotely navigate the HoneyBot through it.
Before beginning this study IRB approval was requested from the Georgia Tech Office of Research
Integrity Assurance and the experiment protocol was designed.
The ”HoneyMaze” was constructed from approximately six 2 x 4 foot pegboards (used for the
base or ground surface) and several hundred 1/2 x 48 inch wooden round dowels. The wooden
dowels were cut, using circular saw equipment from the Georgia Tech ECE Senior Design Lab,
into 6 inch pegs. These 6 inch pegs were then strategically ”nailed” into the pegboard base, one
peg per every 3 peg holes, in the design of the preselected maze. After the pegs were secured in
place rolls of 48 inch x 25 ft reflective insulation were cut into 7 inch tall strips and hot glued to
one side of the pegs to create barrier walls. Reflective insulation was used as the wall material
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because a positive correlation was identified between the robot’s distance sensor accuracy and the
reflectivity of the surfaces measured against.
Figure 4.4: HoneyMaze with danger signs throughout.
The experiment required individuals to read instructions on how to navigate a robot through
an online maze and then access the robot through a web interface. The participants were told the
online robot corresponded to a real robot who at their every arrow keystroke would actuate through
a life sized maze identical to the one on their screen. The exact instructions given to the research
subjects can be found in Appendix B. Subjects were told that their mission was to navigate the
robot through the maze fast as possible using only the online GUI maze and live sensor values from
the robot displayed on screen. They were informed that the research objective was to determine
the optimal constraint profile for the best performance and efficiency of the remotely controlled
robot. A screenshot of the website is shown in Figure 4.5. At the bottom of the figure is a timer,
participants were given 75 seconds to preview the maze and plan a route, then 60 seconds to
actually navigate the robot to the finish flags. The ”constraints” they were told was that the robot
moves very slow and they should plan their routes wisely, making sure to consider all possible
options. The research subjects were otherwise given no specific guidance concerning the danger
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signs and when asked about them experiment proctors only responded with ”the meaning of the
danger sign is up for interpretation, consider all possible options”. To assist with the participant
recruitment process and as an added incentive for subjects to strive to complete the maze quickly,
they were promised $5 for participating and $10 if they completed the maze before their 60 seconds
ran out.
Figure 4.5: HoneyBot user experiment website.
The real merit of the study, which is what the research participants were not told, is that the
danger signs mark ”shortcuts” through the online maze and the navigation task cannot be com-
pleted in the 60 second time limit without cutting through at least two of them. The danger signs
can be thought of as the honey or vulnerable resource on a real system/network tempting attackers
to compromise it. The real maze contains walls where the danger signs are located and if they de-
cided to take the ”shortcut”, the real robot would stop actuating through the real maze and simulate
all further interactions. After cutting through a danger sign the online GUI robot continues through
the maze ”normally”, but all data output to the sensor control panel from that point on is spoofed.
After completing the experiment participants are given a survey, shown in Appendix C, and asked
about the choices they made and what happened during the experiment.
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4.2.1 Proof of Concept HoneyBot Sensor Model Development
Empirical observations were used to build the Device Models for the proof of concept HoneyBot
sensors. Appendix D contains the Python script used for the sensor data collection process. For the
temperature sensor, compass, laser distance sensor, and ultrasonic sonar the model development
process was as follows:
1. The HoneyBot was placed at a viable maze location. For instance B from the labeled maze
in Appendix B.
2. The Python script from Appendix D was executed and given the robots’ coordinates in the
physical maze. After that the program polls the robots’ sensors for data values.
3. The script then creates an index in a CSV file with the given coordinates and adds the sensor
values to the index.
This process is repeated several times at each of the 60 viable maze locations. A ”viable maze
location” is defined as an allowable maze location for the robot to navigate to. Once these models
were built the collision sensor device model was very simple. Since the robot was not allowed to
perform commands that could actually cause it to crash, the only time the collision sensor needed
to read ”True” was when the robot ”cut through” a danger sign. To do this the actual reading
from the collision sensor (”False”) was always outputted to the user, unless they ”cut through”
a danger sign. At that point the collision sensor outputted ”True” and the ultrasonic sonar/laser
distance sensor outputted 0 for consistency. This was to really create the illusion that the robot hit
an obstacle, but managed to keep going.
4.3 Experiment Results
The purpose of the research experiment was to evaluate the HoneyBot and determine how con-
vincing the Sensor Device Models developed from real observations were. Of particular interest in
the study were participants who ”cut through” danger signs to complete the maze quicker, because
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that action automatically triggered the Input Verification Module of the Robot Controller, which
stopped the real robot from actuating and initiated the simulation.
4.3.1 Research Subject Demographics and Statistics
The research experiments took place on the Georgia Tech Atlanta Campus over the course of one
week and was performed by 40 individuals from various academic/cultural backgrounds, physical
locations across the US, and stages of life. The vast majority of subjects (95%) were young adults
between the ages of 18 and 26. Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 give some quick statistics about the
research subjects, including their regional location and cultural background.
Figure 4.6: HoneyBot user experiment research participant statistics.
4.3.2 HoneyBot Experiment Findings
The HoneyBot experiment took approximately 20 minutes per participant and consisted of an ini-
tial instruction overview, the actual experiment completion, and a concluding survey. The Robot
Experiment Survey, found in Appendix C was distributed through Qualtrics Online Survey Soft-
ware, and consisted of, at most 12 questions. Certain questions were displayed/omitted based on
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Figure 4.7: HoneyBot user experiment research participant locations by US region.
Figure 4.8: HoneyBot user experiment research participant ethnicity breakdown.
participant responses. For example, if Question 4, ’was the overall experiment completion process
difficult?’, was answered ’No’ then Question 5, ’what made it difficult?’, was not asked. Five
questions on the other hand, were always asked. They served to provide baseline knowledge about
the subjects’ experience. The questions were:
1. Were you able to navigate from start to finish of the maze within the time limit?
2. Map your navigated route by selecting the letters on the graphic below. If you did not finish
the maze select to the nearest point you reached.
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3. On a scale of 1-5, where 1 is very inaccurate and 5 is very accurate, how accurate did the
sensor values displayed on the control panel seem throughout the experiment?
4. Was the overall experiment completion process difficult?
5. Did you at any point cross through a danger sign?
Figure 4.9 shows the user responses to survey questions 1, 4, and 6 from Appendix C. It can be
gathered from the pie charts that the overall experiment completion process was not difficult, most
people did not finish the maze in the allotted time, and a little over a third of the participants (14
people) ”cut through” at least one danger sign and were shown simulated sensor values.
(a) (b)
(c)
Figure 4.9: Survey responses to (a) Question 4 (b) Question 6 (c) and Question 1 from Appendix
C.
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Question 2 came with the labeled maze shown in Appendix C, and according to the survey
results, two of the three most traveled paths ”cut through” danger signs. 79% of subjects took
the top three most navigated paths and the only other consistently navigated path (taken by 3
participants) also ”cut through” a danger sign. It is important to note that the routes depicted in
Figure 4.10 indicate ”attempted” navigated routes, most subjects did not complete the maze, but
indicated that was the route they intended to take.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 4.10: Top three most navigated routes by participants (a) 56% of subjects took this route
(b) 22% of subjects took this route (c) and 1% of participants took this route.
In total, 14 participants cut through danger signs and triggered the HoneyBot ’simulation
mode’. Table 4.1 shows that of all 40 participants surveyed, 70% of them rated the sensor accuracy
during the whole experiment a 3 or 4 (mean of 3.58) out of 5. And of the 14 participants who
cut through a danger sign and unknowingly experienced simulated sensor values, 71% rated the
sensor accuracy a 4 or 5 (mean of 3.86) out of 5. This can be interpreted to mean research subjects
did not notice a difference between the simulated sensor values and the real sensor values coming
from the HoneyBot. From this it can be concluded that the proof of concept HoneyBot developed
successfully fools ”deviant users” and the Sensor Device Models effectively mirror reality.
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Table 4.1: Survey results to questions about robot sensor accuracy
Scale
(1 is very inaccurate and 5 is very accurate)
How accurate did the sensor values
displayed on the control panel seem
throughout the experiment?
How accurate did the sensor values
displayed on the control panel seem
after you crossed through danger sign(s)?
1 1 (2.5%) 1 (7.14%)
2 4 (10%) 0 (0%)
3 13 (32.5%) 3 (21.43%)
4 15 (37.5%) 6 (42.86%)
5 7 (17.5%) 4 (28.57%)
Total 40 (100%) 14 (100%)
4.4 Limitations
The proof of concept HoneyBot implementation presented in this thesis serves as a show of fea-
sibility for the concepts introduced. It is in no way a production ready implementation and has
several limitations.
4.4.1 HoneyBot Website
The website used to remotely access and control the proof of concept was simplistic. It was built
by manually constructing HTML, CSS, and JS pages as opposed to using a web framework like the
Bootstrap toolkit. Bootstrap would have allowed for the use of a template/theme that would have
erased the need to write HTML by hand. The look of the website was clunky and and a handful of
users complained of a few non-intuitive features.
4.4.2 Robotic Platform and Sensors
The GoPiGo 3 was the chosen robotics system for the proof of concept HoneyBot and while it
had many advantages, including its price point (approximately $200) and its plug and play sensor
support, there were some down sides as well. Given its pricing the GoPiGo 3 was an economical
robot targeting individuals wanting to try their hand at both programming and robotics. It is not a
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high end system for an avid roboticist, and reliability was an issue from time to time. This extends
to the sensors as well, the manufacturer did not expect them to be used in critical infrastructure and
thus they were prone to ’soft errors’, such as randomly outputting erroneous data. A higher end
robotic platform would be considered for more consistency and reliability.
4.4.3 Evaluation Caveats
The robot experiment evaluation, though it proved the proof of concept HoneyBot was convincing
should be taken with a grain of salt. The small sample size of 40, is not enough to draw far-reaching
conclusions. More user testing needs to be done to solidify the preliminary conclusions drawn. In
addition to this, while there were some safeguarding (research proctors monitored the experiment
task) against user falsifying the self reported survey results, there is always the possibility of fabri-
cation when human subjects are involved and this must be considered.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
The need for security in the field of robotics will only grow in the coming years as robots are
used for extensive tasks across various facets of life. Vulnerability and susceptibility to exploits in
networked systems is unavoidable, and precautions must be taken to ensure that:
• The robotic system will be able to distinguish between safe and unsafe actions its com-
manded to perform
• The system uses this distinction to protect itself from physical harm
• There are reliable mechanisms means for system administrators to learn of compromise
• There are methods for gathering intelligence on system intruders
To help solve these problems, this thesis introduced the HoneyBot, the first honeypot specif-
ically designed for robotic systems. The HoneyBot leverages HoneyPhy, techniques from tradi-
tional honeypots, and Device Models were built for common robotic sensors and queried at runtime
to provide convincing system state updates and responses. By simulating unsafe actions and phys-
ically performing safe actions on the HoneyBot attackers are fooled into believing their exploits
are successful, while logging all the communication to be used for attribution and threat model
creation.
One underlying assumption behind the HoneyBot is that it lives on networks set up similar to
the Georgia Tech Robotarium [37] in which users have no physical or visual access to the robotic
system and send all commands remotely. Under this network configuration, the users only channel
for keeping abreast of system changes are the real time system responses sent over the network.
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The HoneyBot is a hybrid interaction honeypot specifically designed for robot systems and could
potentially be the de facto standard for networked robot security as the prevalence of robots grow
in society.
5.2 Future Work
The overarching goal of this research was to build a honeypot for robotic systems that could rea-
sonably convince attackers that have remotely connected to a robotic system with malintent that
their malicious payloads are successful, while in reality simulating data responses and preserving
the real system. This was done through a proof of concept HoneyBot built on a GoPiGo 3 and was
evaluated through a user study. While the preliminary results of the research study are promising,
there is more work that can be done to improve the robustness of the ideas and implementations
presented.
5.2.1 Exploring New Robotic Platforms
As described in the Section 4.4 the GoPiGo 3 robotic platform was sufficient for simple proof of
concept research, but in order to extend the reaches of these ideas and frameworks, it should be
replaced. A custom built robot that has more application to the manufacturing industry could be
used. For instance, a robotic arm that must do a simple task such as pick up an object from one
location and move it to another. This robot would normally perform the task on a loop, but also has
the ability to be remotely accessed and controlled for maintenance purposes. An attacker could use
this to throw off the entire assembly line process costing the organization hundreds of thousands
dollars. In this example, the HoneyBot arm would detect the deviant commands and simulate the
malicious actions all while logging and alerting system administrators of the compromise.
5.2.2 Rethinking HoneyBot Remote Access Mechanisms and Evaluation Redesign
With a change in the robotic platform would also come a necessary change in remote access tech-
niques and new methods for evaluation. The proof of concept HoneyBot was accessible through
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a website which was functional, but had few usability issues. The new more industrial robotic
platform may be better suited to be accessed via a command line tool such as SSH. If on the other
hand a website is still found to be the best means, a more sophisticated design must be considered.
The web server through which the proof of concept HoneyBot was accessed was run locally on the
robot’s Raspberry Pi, this introduced certain computational constraints and led to lag when many
processes were running. To facilitate this, it would be imperative to run the web server for access-
ing the robotic system securely off-site and with enough resources to handle many web requests
simultaneously.
Evaluation of the new platform would, of course, be heavily dependent of the main purpose of
the new robot. Even still, the evaluation should not only involve human user testing, but general
performance metrics as well. It would be important to note differences in response times of real
vs simulated responses sent over the network, as well as any detectable footprint the HoneyBot
software would leave on the system. In order to remain undetectable, processes should be hidden or
run in an obfuscated manner very similar to a root-kit. Attackers/malicious parties who somehow
gain full access to the system should not in theory be able to notice a difference between identical
systems if one is running the HoneyBot software and the other is not.
5.2.3 Optimizing for Speed Over the Network
In the same vein of imperceptibility, random lag and general system unresponsiveness plagued the
proof of concept HoneyBot from time to time. On a new robotic platform (or even for the current
one) techniques must be employed to combat this as much as possible. It is impossible to do away
with all lag or connectivity problems on the Internet, but with more computational resources and
applying well known web toolkits, the occurrences can be reduced.
5.2.4 Software Generalization
The final proposed upgrade to the HoneyBot would be to make the code less platform dependent.
The ideal situation would be to have a framework that is plug and play with as many robotic
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systems (ground robots, drones, humanoids) as possible. For this to be realized there are a few
things that need to be done:
• A common HoneyBot API should be created for robots to subscribe to
• A minimum base set of sensors which all HoneyBot robotic systems are required to have
must be defined
• A minimum set of computational resources which all HoneyBot robotic systems are required
to have must be available on board the robotic system
• An automated process for managing sensor model generation must be established
Platform independence will be the most challenging of the proposed updates to the HoneyBot,
but the software challenges can be overcome through the specifications defined above. Robotic










5 class DataViewController: UIViewController,
CLLocationManagerDelegate {
6 var locationManager: CLLocationManager = CLLocationManager()
7 var startLocation: CLLocation!
8
9 @IBOutlet weak var magHeading: UILabel!
10 @IBOutlet weak var trueHeading: UILabel!
11 @IBOutlet weak var latitude: UILabel!
12 @IBOutlet weak var longitude: UILabel!
13 @IBOutlet weak var arrowImage: UIImageView!
14
15 override func viewDidLoad() {
16 super.viewDidLoad()
17 self.view.backgroundColor = UIColor.lightGray
18
19 locationManager.desiredAccuracy = kCLLocationAccuracyBest





24 startLocation = nil
25
26 // Create the image for the compass
27 arrowImage.image = UIImage(named: "arrow.png")
28 self.view.addSubview(arrowImage)
29 arrowImage.center = self.view.center
30 }
31








40 func locationManagerShouldDisplayHeadingCalibration(_ manager




44 func locationManager(_ manager: CLLocationManager,
didUpdateHeading newHeading: CLHeading) {
45 if (newHeading.headingAccuracy > 0) {
46 magHeading.text = String(format: "%.3f", newHeading.
magneticHeading)
44
47 trueHeading.text = String(format: "%.3f", newHeading.
trueHeading)
48
49 let heading = -1.0 * Double.pi * newHeading.
magneticHeading / 180.0
50 arrowImage.transform = CGAffineTransform(
rotationAngle: CGFloat(heading))
51






:5555/", method: .post, parameters: parameters, encoding:
JSONEncoding.default)
58 .validate()
59 .responseJSON { response in
60 switch response.result {
61 case .success:
62 print(response)









71 func locationManager(_ manager: CLLocationManager,
didUpdateLocations locations: [CLLocation]) {
72 let latestLocation: CLLocation = locations[locations.
count - 1]
73
74 latitude.text = String(format: "%.3f", latestLocation.
coordinate.latitude)








B.1 Overall Experimental Objective
We have built a robotic assessment course for testing the navigational abilities of a remotely acces-
sible robot under various constraints. During this study participants will remotely access and guide
a real robot through a real maze using an online virtual interface. After collecting sufficient ex-
perimental data, we will end the study and evaluate the results to determine the optimal constraint
profile for the performance and efficiency of the robot.
B.2 Experiment Goals
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This is Dex Jr. and his maze. Your task is to navigate as quickly as possible through the online
virtual maze using the arrow keys (↑ ← ↓ →) on your keyboard to the finish flag. Dexs’ sensor
values will be available in an on-screen control panel (to the right of the maze) to help guide you
and keep you aware of his physical status. Make sure to pay close attention to the sensor control
panel throughout the experiment, questions in the completion survey will ask you about it.
As you move GUI Dex through the online maze, the real Dex will move through the real maze in
the same way.
B.3 Experiment Steps
1. Click the link to the experiment website. You will be directed to a web page asking you for
a username and password.
2. As soon as the correct credentials are entered the experiment will begin. You will have
75 seconds to preview the maze and plan your navigation strategy. Make sure you consider
ALL POSSIBLE ROUTES (even the risky ones) as you only have 60 seconds to complete
the maze and the robot moves VERY SLOW. After you have strategized you must click the
start button below the maze, if the timer runs out before you click start you will be unable to
complete the experiment.
3. After clicking start you will have 60 seconds to complete the maze.
4. Once you’ve completed the experiment complete the survey at the link provided below.
B.4 Note
• For navigating the robot through the maze, you only need to press an arrow key (↑ ←
↓ →) on your keyboard ONCE, when the robot is STATIONARY. It will automatically
make SEVERAL HOPS in the pressed direction to the next viable maze location and once it
stops you can press the next arrow key. Pressing arrow keys more than once while the robot
is moving will not make it move any faster. If you press an arrow key (↑ ← ↓ →) while
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the robot is stationary and it does not move that means the robot is unable to move in
that direction.
• Do not go backwards. This feature has been disabled because the task is timed and if you
reverse you will not complete the maze.
• Do not refresh experiment website once youve logged in. If you do so, you will be locked








Was the overall experiment completion process difficult?
Block 2
What made it difficult?
Did you at any point cross through a danger sign?
Block 1










Select the danger sign(s) you crossed on the graphic below? 
On a scale of 1-5, where 1 is very inaccurate and 5 is very accurate. How accurate did the
sensor values displayed on the control panel seem after you crossed through danger
sign(s)?
Why did you cross through the danger sign(s)?
 
Sensor Accuracy     







Was there a difference between the GUI control panel values when you were navigating
the robot after you crossed through the danger sign(s) versus before you crossed?







SENSOR DEVICE MODEL CREATION CODE
1 import sys
2 import pandas as pd
3 import numpy as np
4 from pathlib import Path
5 import easygopigo3 as easy
6
7 gopigo = easy.EasyGoPiGo3()
8
9 deviceModelData = []
10 usPort = 'AD2'
11 collisionPort = 'AD1'
12 distancePort = 'I2C'





18 inputX = input('Enter x coord: ')
19 inputY = input('Enter y coord: ')
20 inputCompass = input('Manually enter true heading: ')
21
22 temperature_sensor = gopigo.init_dht_sensor(temperaturePort,
0)
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23 distance_sensor = gopigo.init_distance_sensor(distancePort)
24 ultrasonic_sensor = gopigo.init_ultrasonic_sensor(usPort)
25 reading = ultrasonic_sensor.read_inches()
26 dist_reading = round(distance_sensor.read_inches(), 1)
27 temp_reading = np.ceil(temperature_sensor.read_temperature()
* 1.8 + 32)
28










38 # Write device data to csv
39 dataArray = np.array(deviceModelData)
40 index = dataArray[:, 0]
41 columns = ['Sonar', 'Distance', 'Temperature', 'Compass']
42
43 dataVals = np.delete(dataArray, 0, axis=1)
44 df = pd.DataFrame(dataVals, index=pd.MultiIndex.from_tuples(
index), columns=columns)
45 df.index.names = ['x', 'y']
46
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47 # Write to csv
48 outCSV = Path("out.csv")
49 if outCSV.is_file():
50 df.to_csv(path_or_buf='out.csv', mode='a', header=False)
51 else:
52 df.to_csv(path_or_buf='out.csv', columns=columns, mode='a')
53
54 if __name__ == "__main__":
55 try:
56 out = True
57 while out:





Listing D.1: Code used to collect sensor device model data and export to csv
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